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DOCTRINAL DYNAMISM, BORROWING, AND THE
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN RULES AND RIGHTS
Joseph Blocher and Luke Morgan*

ABSTRACT
The study of “Rights Dynamism,” exemplified in Timothy Zick’s new book on the
First Amendment’s relationship with the rest of the Bill of Rights, can enrich our
understanding of constitutional rights. It also opens a door to another potentially fruitful arena: what we call “Doctrinal Dynamism.” Constitutional rights often interact
and generate new meanings and applications by way of importing and exporting one
another’s doctrinal rules, even when the rights themselves do not intersect directly
in the context of a single case. Focusing on these doctrinal exchanges can illuminate the
strengths and weaknesses of various rules, the specific interests underlying different
constitutional guarantees, and the sometimes inextricable relationship between particular rights and their constitutive doctrines. In this Article, we explore the definitional
challenge—what is doctrine?—before identifying some lessons learned when doctrine
migrates between rights and when it stays home.
INTRODUCTION
Scholarship about the relationships between U.S. constitutional rights has generated valuable insights about the nature of those rights, both individually and in concert.1 Timothy Zick’s new book—the centerpiece of this Symposium—is a powerful
extension of this literature on what might be called intramural comparative constitutional law.2
Zick focuses on the legal interactions between the Free Speech Clause and other
constitutional rights: how free speech can help enable the social movements that
* Lanty L. Smith ’67 Professor, Duke University School of Law; Duke University School
of Law, 2019; Indiana University, BA 2014. Thanks to Ash Bhagwat, Michael Coenen, Caroline
Corbin, Deborah Hellman, Jessie Hill, and Doug Laycock for helpful comments, and especially
to Tim Zick and the editors of the William & Mary Bill of Rights Journal for including us in
this engaging Symposium.
1
See generally JOHN D. INAZU, LIBERTY’S REFUGE: THE FORGOTTEN FREEDOM OF ASSEMBLY (2012); RONALD J. KROTOSZYNSKI, JR., RECLAIMING THE PETITION CLAUSE: SEDITIOUS
LIBEL, “OFFENSIVE” PROTEST, AND THE RIGHT TO PETITION THE GOVERNMENT FOR A REDRESS
OF GRIEVANCES (2012); Sonja R. West, Awakening the Press Clause, 58 UCLA L. REV.
1025 (2011).
2
See generally TIMOTHY ZICK, THE DYNAMIC FREE SPEECH CLAUSE: FREE SPEECH AND
ITS RELATION TO OTHER CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS (2018).
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generate doctrinal change, for example; or, perhaps less desirably, how the magnetism of the Free Speech Clause can overwhelm other rights like petition, press, and
assembly, rendering them constitutional surplusage.3 When courts (who are the major
players in Zick’s story4) engage in intratextualism,5 borrowing,6 combining,7 and the
like,8 they both identify and create similarities and differences between particular
bodies of law. As Zick notes, this can happen in many ways, including by analogy or
by “borrowing or modeling in which . . . standards, principles, and values” from one
right are used in the context of another.9
This is what Zick calls “Rights Dynamism,”10 and it has significant implications
for the rights involved. Though he is an astute and careful observer of rights’ interactions, Zick’s goals are not just descriptive or taxonomic, but also normative.11 He
argues, for example, that cross-pollination of First and Second Amendment doctrine
could threaten the development of both rights.12
We contend that the study of Rights Dynamism can teach us something not only
about rights, but about doctrine. This “Doctrinal Dynamism” is a way of reframing the
inquiry, not replacing it. Our goal is to pick out a particular thread of Rights Dynamism
and consider it in more detail, a task that we think is entirely complementary with the
approaches taken by Zick and many other contributors to this Symposium. Rather
than focusing on the traders (the rights themselves), we might instead consider what
they trade—the characteristics, rules, principles, and so on that are borrowed or shared
between distinct constitutional guarantees. Platonically speaking, this is a bit like
studying the shadows on the cave wall, but we think it may hold significant insights
for constitutional law.
The particular shadows that interest us are legal doctrines—the characteristics
of a right that are likely relevant to the resolution of a formal legal dispute.13 And
3

Id. at xii.
See, e.g., id. at 29 (“Owing to the interpretive powers and functions of judges, dynamic
interpretation is most visible and recognizable in the courts.”).
5
See generally Akhil Reed Amar, Intratextualism, 112 HARV. L. REV. 747 (1999).
6
Nelson Tebbe & Robert L. Tsai, Constitutional Borrowing, 108 MICH. L. REV. 459,
460 (2010) (“Our investigation, at bottom, concerns how separate bodies of legal knowledge
are interconnected and managed.”).
7
Michael Coenen, Combining Constitutional Clauses, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 1067, 1070
(2016) (“The Court . . . has sometimes combined constitutional clauses, deriving an overall
conclusion of constitutional validity (or invalidity) from the joint decisional force of two or
more constitutional provisions.”).
8
Kerry Abrams & Brandon L. Garrett, Cumulative Constitutional Rights, 97 B.U. L.
REV. 1309, 1309–10 (2017) (discussing “cumulative,” “hybrid,” and “intersecting” rights).
9
ZICK, supra note 2, at 210.
10
Id. at 5–6.
11
Id. at 1–3.
12
Id. at 203–04.
13
See id. at 26–28 (distinguishing between “the action [that] takes place in courtrooms” on
4
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our units of analysis are doctrinal rules: the particular statements of legal principle
that are treated as relevant and necessary to resolve cases involving constitutional
guarantees.14 Doctrinal rules are among the building blocks of formal law, so essentially this means breaking law down into smaller constituent elements. But one way
to get a handle on a larger phenomenon is to start with its smallest pieces.15
Beginning with doctrine, we can learn a great deal both about the rights that
doctrines call home and about the usefulness and significance of different doctrinal
rules. Sometimes a rule announced in a case involving one constitutional claim will
crop up years later in another case involving a different claim.16 What prompts that
migration? Which rules tend to travel, and which stay tied to their initial home? What
does that tell us about the rules themselves?
The tiers of scrutiny are one prominent example. After originating in the equal
protection context,17 the tiers found a ready home in the Court’s free speech jurisprudence.18 Now they are migrating yet again, as many courts find that they are a useful
tool for analyzing Second Amendment claims.19 What makes the tiers so migratory?
What features do the First, Second, and Fourteenth Amendments share that allow
the tiers to fit comfortably within their doctrine? And what is it about other rights,
the one hand and “public advocacy,” “references and invocations” by public officials, “[l]egal scholarship,” and “national discourses” engaged in by “the general public” on the other).
14
See Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175,
1176–77 (1989).
15
The point is not that law needs its own Mendeleev to create a periodic table of law
whereby doctrinal elements combine to create doctrinal molecules. Our much more limited claim
is that some complex systems—law is one—can be broken down into constituent parts. See, e.g.,
Duncan Kennedy, A Semiotics of Legal Argument, 42 SYRACUSE L. REV. 75, 75–76 (1991).
16
E.g., Jennifer E. Laurin, Trawling for Herring: Lessons in Doctrinal Borrowing and
Convergence, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 670, 674 (2011) (“This Essay identifies three examples of
that trend: the influence of municipal liability doctrine under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on an emergent
‘systemic’ view of the exclusionary rule; Hudson v. Michigan’s adoption of an exclusionary
rule causation framework that is resonant with that utilized in constitutional tort litigation;
and the increasing tendency of the Court to consider the availability of constitutional tort
remedies as a justification for denying the remedy of suppression.”).
17
See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 215–16 (1944) (purporting to apply “the
most rigid scrutiny” to the internment of American citizens of Japanese ancestry); United
States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) (suggesting that legislation which
targets “discrete and insular minorities . . . may call for a correspondingly more searching
judicial inquiry”).
18
For early examples, see NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438 (1963) (“The decisions
of this Court have consistently held that only a compelling state interest in the regulation of
a subject within the State’s constitutional power to regulate can justify limiting First Amendment freedoms.”); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 449 (1961) (noting the “close scrutiny”
demanded of the Court “when First Amendment liberties are at issue”).
19
Eric Ruben & Joseph Blocher, From Theory to Doctrine: An Empirical Analysis of the
Right to Keep and Bear Arms After Heller, 67 DUKE L.J. 1433, 1494–96 (2018) (noting “an
increasing application of levels-of-scrutiny analysis” in Second Amendment cases between
2008 and 2016).
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such as the Sixth Amendment right to confront one’s accuser, that has caused the tiers
to skip over them?
While the tiers of scrutiny provide a ready set of moves and non-moves to study—a
set that we are not shy to take advantage of here—the significance of Doctrinal Dynamism inheres far beyond the tiers. Innumerable arguments advanced by scholars and
litigants are really questions about Doctrinal Dynamism, or questions upon which
Doctrinal Dynamism can bear. To provide just a few examples, honing in on doctrine
can provide insight into whether the Free Speech Clause’s content-neutrality doctrine
can be usefully adopted in Second Amendment cases;20 what accounts for the rise
of animus doctrines across constitutional provisions;21 why incidental burdens on
protected activity trigger strict scrutiny in the free-speech context and essentially no
additional review in the free-exercise context;22 and why Free Exercise and Establishment Clause claims are not analyzed under the disparate-impact doctrine utilized in
equal-protection cases.23 These are not new questions; we merely submit that starting
with the doctrine rather than the interpretations of the rights might provide new insight.
In this Article, we examine more closely the nature of doctrine and the ways in
which focusing on doctrine is distinct from the broader study of Rights Dynamism.
By highlighting illustrative doctrinal rules, we can ask: (a) where and why those rules
originated, (b) where they are used now, and (c) why they have been adopted across
substantive categories. So, for example, one might find that (a) strict scrutiny evolved
in equal-protection cases to smoke out government animus,24 and (b) now applies
also to content-based speech restrictions, (c) because courts care about government
animus when it comes to content-based restrictions.25
We do this in three parts. Part I explains and defends the focus on doctrine. Part
II explores the processes of Doctrinal Dynamism, and the factors that make some
20

Compare Gregory P. Magarian, Speaking Truth to Firepower: How the First Amendment Destabilizes the Second, 91 TEX. L. REV. 49, 63–64 (2012) (“We cannot usefully identify
‘content-based’ gun regulations . . . .”), with Gary E. Barnett, Note, The Reasonable Regulation
of the Right to Keep and Bear Arms, 6 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 607, 623 (2008) (proposing
a category of “Content-Based Gun Regulations”).
21
For an accounting of this phenomenon, see generally WILLIAM D. ARAIZA, ANIMUS
(2017).
22
See Michael C. Dorf, Incidental Burdens on Fundamental Rights, 109 HARV. L. REV.
1175, 1200–11 (1996) (comparing the Court’s treatment of incidental burdens in the free
speech and free exercise contexts).
23
See, e.g., Kelsey Curtis, Note, The Partiality of Neutrality, 41 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL’Y 935, 935 (2018) (arguing that the neutrality doctrines “in contemporary Establishment
Clause and Free Exercise clause jurisprudence . . . do not achieve neutrality” and suggesting
utilizing disparate impact doctrine in free exercise cases).
24
ARAIZA, supra note 21, at 3–4. Obviously this is only one way—albeit a plausible
one—to account for strict scrutiny. Our goal here is not to defend a particular understanding
of strict scrutiny, but to show how different doctrines might be understood as having particular purposes.
25
Geoffrey R. Stone, Content-Neutral Restrictions, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 46, 55–56 (1987).
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doctrinal rules more likely than others to migrate from one right to another. Part III
does the same for doctrinal rules that stay home.
I. WHY FOCUS ON DOCTRINE?
Zick’s book adds to a rich existing body of scholarship regarding the interactions
between various areas of constitutional law. Scholars have explored, for example,
the ways in which constitutional clauses might be “combined,”26 the ways in which
textual clauses of the Constitution might be read in conjunction with one another,27 and
how rights claims can be “cumulative,” “hybrid,” or “intersecting.”28 In Zick’s account
and others, this has meant considering rights’ political, rhetorical, and legal roles.29
Our more limited goal here is to focus on one specific way in which areas of constitutional doctrine—specifically, constitutional rights doctrine—interact with one
another. In particular, we want to identify and track legal rules as they travel across
domains. Doing so, we hope, will give us some insight, not only into the rules themselves, but also into the environments they inhabit.
In order for our project to succeed—in fact, in order for it to get off the ground
at all—we must be able to identify and define our basic unit of analysis: doctrinal rules.
This is no mean feat. Some units of doctrine worth examining do not appear to be
“rules” in the usual sense of the word—that is, reasonably concise statements of principle that guide the resolution of legal disputes. We don’t mean to limit ourselves
to “rules” in the narrower sense of outcome-determinative principles triggered by certain factual scenarios;30 standards count as “rules” for our purposes. The tiers of scrutiny, for example, are a kind of doctrinal methodology that generates case-determinative
rules like the directive that race-based discrimination must be narrowly tailored to
advance a compelling government interest.31
In this way, doctrine can be thought of as existing in tiers of increasing specificity,
much like biological taxonomy. At the most generic level, there is “First Amendment
doctrine,” which is the collective body of First Amendment law.32 That doctrine is composed more narrowly of certain methodologies, which generate rules, which generate
binding precedent.33 Doctrine migrates between rights at all levels of specificity,34
26

Coenen, supra note 7, at 1070.
See generally Amar, supra note 5.
28
Abrams & Garrett, supra note 8, at 1309–10.
29
ZICK, supra note 2, at 9.
30
See Kathleen M. Sullivan, Foreword: The Justices of Rules and Standards, 106 HARV.
L. REV. 22, 58 (1992).
31
See Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 570 U.S. 297, 310 (2013).
32
See Elena Kagan, Private Speech, Public Purpose: The Role of Governmental Motive
in First Amendment Doctrine, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 413, 413 (1996).
33
See Scalia, supra note 14, at 1176–77.
34
Matthew D. Adler, Commentary, Can Constitutional Borrowing Be Justified? A Comment
on Tushnet, 1 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 350, 351 (1998) (noting that the subject of borrowing “could
27
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and so our use of “doctrinal rules” is meant to include both the more specific rules
and the broader methodologies.
Using doctrinal rules as our unit of analysis should make the study of Rights Dynamism more tractable. Lawyers, after all, have a comparative advantage when it comes
to studying legal doctrine. But even through the judicial lens, rights interact at different
levels of abstraction—for example, in individual cases and in broader movements of
shifting doctrine—with very different implications for the phenomenon of dynamism.35
Consider two extremes of the spectrum. A litigant in a particular case asserts
multiple constitutional-rights claims, which might or might not interact with one
another, such as the due-process and equal-protection claims in Obergefell v. Hodges.36
Should her rights claims be considered serially, or in conjunction? If serially, and if
one resolves the case, are the others moot? If in conjunction, do the claims strengthen
one another? Do they merge into a single “hybrid” right, as discussed in Employment
Division v. Smith?37 Or are they so different and perhaps even incompatible that they
are in tension? Many of Zick’s examples exhibit this kind of case-level interactivity.38
And at the level of the individual case, the questions about Rights Dynamism tend to
revolve around whether particular claims, in the context of particular factual scenarios,
either have synergies with one another or displace one another. For example, Zick
shows how cases involving claims of both free speech and free exercise frequently
have been resolved as the former.39
Judicial resolution of these individual cases, in turn, generates doctrine.40 A rule
may be announced by the Supreme Court more or less out of the blue—the rule of
be any part, large or small, of the constitutional regime: a single sentence in the text of the constitution, a whole article in the constitution, a judicial doctrine interpreting some part of the
constitution’s text, a set of formal or informal understandings among legislators, the executive
branch, or even among the population at large as to what the constitution requires”).
35
ZICK, supra note 2, at 17 (noting that the process of interaction between constitutional
rights “affects constitutional remedies in individual cases[,] . . . [and] also influences interpretations of individual constitutional rights and, more broadly, understandings of constitutional liberty”).
36
See Brief for Petitioners, Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015) (No. 14-556),
2015 WL 860738, at *32, *38; ZICK, supra note 2, at 25.
37
Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 881 (1990) (holding that religious exemptions to
neutral laws of general applicability can be granted only when the conduct involved “the Free
Exercise Clause in conjunction with other constitutional protections, such as freedom of
speech and of the press . . . or the rights of parents . . . to direct the education of their
children”); Michael W. McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism and the Smith Decision, 57
U. CHI. L. REV. 1109, 1122 (1990) (criticizing the case and arguing that the hybrid rights
exception is “not . . . to be taken seriously”).
38
See ZICK, supra note 2, at 114.
39
Id.
40
See Jack B. Weinstein, The Role of Judges in a Government Of, By, and For the People:
Notes for the Fifty-Eighth Cardozo Lecture, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 1, 18 (2008) (arguing that
judges make changes in the law “through small steps in individual cases”).
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Smith, for example41—and constitute vertical precedent thereafter. Or that rule might
develop through gradual adoption, like the use of intermediate scrutiny in some Second
Amendment cases.42 Whatever their origins, these rules can be combined into doctrinal frameworks, which then provide a baseline for broader and more generalized
forms of “dynamism.”43 In their thorough and perceptive analysis of the phenomenon,
Nelson Tebbe and Robert Tsai define constitutional borrowing as “the practice of
importing doctrines, rationales, tropes, or other legal elements from one area of constitutional law into another for persuasive ends.”44 The first form of borrowing in Tebbe
and Tsai’s framework—“importing doctrines”45—is the kind of Doctrinal Dynamism
that interests us here.
There are, of course, innumerable complications with the concepts (and conceptions) of rules and rule-following.46 One might argue, for example, that doctrinal
rules are simply labels for conclusions, not drivers of reasoning.47 But law and legal
practice are nonetheless constructed around them, and they often seem to do a reasonably good job of predicting how courts will decide cases.48 We will, in other
words, mostly be holding aside difficult questions about the nature of doctrinal rules
and accepting for the sake of analysis that they matter.
We cannot, however, avoid the definitional problem—the challenge of stating
rules. Nearly any rule can be stated at varying levels of specificity. For example, the
tiers of scrutiny—in fact, a great deal of constitutional law49—can be described as a
means-end test. At that level of generality, it will be impossible to get much traction
on if and how rules can be borrowed from one doctrinal area to another, because they
have essentially merged (or melted) into a single rule. We believe, however, that most
constitutional rules can be stated in ways that have reasonably concrete and unique
features. Most judges, lawyers, scholars, and students recognize that strict scrutiny
41

Supra note 37 and accompanying text.
ZICK, supra note 2, at 211.
43
See Tebbe & Tsai, supra note 6, at 461.
44
Id.
45
Id.
46
See, e.g., Scalia, supra note 14, at 1175–76; Frederick Schauer, Rules and the Rule of
Law, 14 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 645 (1991). This is one area where philosophers and legal
scholars have much to learn from one another. See generally SAUL A. KRIPKE, WITTGENSTEIN
ON RULES AND PRIVATE LANGUAGE: AN ELEMENTARY EXPOSITION (1982).
47
See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 212 (1976) (Stevens, J., concurring) (“I am inclined to believe that what has become known as the two-tiered analysis of equal protection
claims . . . rather is a method the Court has employed to explain decisions that actually apply
a single standard in a reasonably consistent fashion.”).
48
See generally Adam Winkler, Fatal in Theory and Strict in Fact: An Empirical Analysis
of Strict Scrutiny in the Federal Courts, 59 VAND. L. REV. 793 (2006).
49
See, e.g., McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 421 (1819) (“Let the end be legitimate,
let it be within the scope of the constitution, and all means which are appropriate, which are
plainly adapted to that end, which are not prohibited, but consist with the letter and spirit of
the constitution, are constitutional.”).
42
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and rational basis review are significantly different, even though both are means-end
tests, and one might dispute whether one or the other is “really” being applied in a
particular case.50
Conversely, if rules are stated narrowly, as they sometimes must be, then there
will be no way for them to apply in diverse contexts. Consider another example generated by the tiers of scrutiny. There is no concern with content discrimination in equalprotection analysis, and free speech does not bother itself with suspect classifications.
But each could be reframed as merely a site-specific wrinkle of the generic “strict
scrutiny” rule to which they belong. Staring too hard at the differences—“this rule
is about racial classifications and that rule is about content discrimination”—masks
the common genealogy.51
That said, there is no mystery about why, for instance, free exercise doctrine has
not borrowed many rules from the Confrontation Clause.52 Not only are the two rights
quite different, but the latter right simply has no application outside the context of
a legal proceeding.53 Yet, there might still be room for useful doctrinal borrowing,
even among seemingly disparate rights, when the problems they confront are similar.54
And where rules are indeed non-transferable, that very fact might provide interesting
insights about both the rules and the rights with which they are related.55
We cannot hope fully to articulate a solution to this broad class of level-ofgenerality problems. And yet judges, lawyers, professors, and students manage to
50

Jamal Greene, Foreword: Rights as Trumps?, 132 HARV. L. REV. 28, 33 (2018) (“We
all have our favorite examples of the Court pretending to apply rational basis review but
instead applying a heightened form of scrutiny, or vice versa.”).
51
In fact, the genealogy may be basically linear. The Free Speech Clause’s rule against
content discrimination—which, along with the bar on prior restraints, is the core of the First
Amendment’s guarantee—seems traceable to an application of Equal Protection principles
to the First Amendment, which first took place in Carey v. Brown. See 447 U.S. 455, 455,
460–62 (1980) (noting that a statute “prohibiting peaceful picketing on . . . public streets and
sidewalks . . . regulates expressive conduct that falls within the First Amendment’s preserve,”
then holding that “[w]hen government regulation discriminations among speech-related
activities . . . the Equal Protection Clause mandates that the legislation be finely tailored to
serve substantial state interests” (emphasis added)); see also Williams-Yulee v. Fla. Bar, 135
S. Ct. 1656, 1681 (2015) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“Among its other functions, the First Amendment is a kind of Equal Protection Clause for ideas.”); Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local
Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983) (citing Carey for the proposition that “content-based”
regulations must be “necessary to serve a compelling state interest and that it is narrowly
drawn to achieve that end”).
52
U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
53
This is not to say that the boundaries of a legal proceeding will always be clear. See,
e.g., Lisa Kern Griffin, State Incentives, Plea Bargaining Regulation, and the Failed Market for
Indigent Defense, 80 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 83, 83 (2017) (noting that “[t]he plea bargaining
process receives minimal oversight from the courts and contains scarce regulatory protections”).
54
See generally Darrell A.H. Miller, Text, History, and Tradition: What the Seventh
Amendment Can Teach Us About the Second, 122 YALE L.J. 852 (2012).
55
See infra Part III.
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implicitly solve them every day when they cite a rule in a decision, or in a brief, or
when they make outlines for their classes. All of these basic legal moves typically
involve citing doctrinal rules, which are the basic elements of a doctrinal framework,
and which are understood as coherent units that might be transplanted from one area
to another. For example, as Zick describes, the Free Exercise Clause has borrowed
“doctrines and rules” from the Free Speech Clause.56 Similarly, some argue that Second
Amendment doctrine should be modeled on that of the First.57 The people who make
this argument, as well as those (including Zick and us) who are more skeptical,58 have
a sense of what they are talking about. As a matter of legal practice, then, the concept
of a “rule” seems to work well enough.
Another objection to our approach might be that, by focusing on doctrinal rules
alone, we are missing the forest for the leaves. We certainly believe that there is more
to constitutional rights than a series of court decisions. The political power of a right
might ultimately be more significant than its power in court.59 And yet courts and
doctrine do play a particularly prominent role in Rights Dynamism, as Zick notes,60
and we believe that focusing on doctrinal rules can help illuminate deep issues in
constitutional rights law and adjudication—an effort we begin below.
A final potential objection is that the difference between “doctrine” and “right”
is not a distinction worth teasing apart, and therefore that Doctrinal Dynamism is not
a useful lens for thinking about Rights Dynamism. There is merit to this point. Below,
we note ways in which certain doctrines and rights can be (or at least seem) mutually
constitutive, making it all but impossible to separate them.61 As Zick makes clear,
though, there are important differences. Focusing solely on the First Amendment’s
Doctrinal Dynamism would miss the myriad other ways in which the Amendment
56

ZICK, supra note 2, at 10.
Id. at 211 (“Some courts have suggested that judicial standards of review for Second
Amendment rights ought to specifically track First Amendment free speech standards.”); see,
e.g., Ezell v. City of Chicago, 651 F.3d 684, 697 (7th Cir. 2011); United States v. Chester,
628 F.3d 673, 682 (4th Cir. 2010). See generally David B. Kopel, The First Amendment
Guide to the Second Amendment, 81 TENN. L. REV. 417 (2014).
58
See, e.g., Joseph Blocher, Categoricalism and Balancing in First and Second Amendment
Analysis, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 375 (2009); Luke Morgan, Note, Leave Your Guns at Home: The
Constitutionality of a Prohibition on Carrying Firearms at Political Demonstrations, 68
DUKE L.J. 175 (2018).
59
Again, the Second Amendment provides a ready example. See Joseph Blocher, Gun
Rights Talk, 94 B.U. L. REV. 813, 813–14 (2014) (“Even after the Supreme Court’s decision
in District of Columbia v. Heller, relatively few gun laws—all of them unusually stringent—
have been struck down on Second Amendment grounds. The Amendment has, however, been
an enormously effective tool for keeping those gun laws from taking root in the first place.”
(internal citations omitted)).
60
See ZICK, supra note 2, at 22 (“Owing to the particular functions and powers of courts
as they relate to intersecting constitutional rights, much of the action in Rights Dynamism
occurs in judicial forums and results in the accumulation of precedents over time.”).
61
See infra Section III.C.
57
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interacts with other constitutional rights.62 Likewise, the ways in which we (perhaps
dynamically) assign meaning and values to constitutional rights are distinct from the
ways in which we implement those rights in doctrine.63
Consider, for instance, Zick’s description of the “basic logic of constitutional
borrowing”:
(1) Right X is similar to freedom of speech—in the sense that it
is a “fundamental” right worthy of heightened protection, or bears
some other general resemblance to freedom of speech. (2) As a
result of two-plus centuries of adjudicating free speech claims,
there is a well-developed doctrinal framework to draw upon. (3)
Therefore, we ought to utilize the doctrines and principles developed to define free speech rights to determine the proper meaning,
scope, and enforcement of Right X.64
In the first instance, there must be an extra-doctrinal connection between two rights—
one relying on “some . . . general resemblance” between the two.65 Only where that
nondoctrinal similarity exists are conditions ripe for doctrine to migrate.66 Studying
the migration itself can tell us more about what travels, when, and why.
But what if doctrine is a poor proxy for the ways in which constitutional meaning
and values are implemented? That is, what if the doctrinal tests we see cited are not
really what drives the cases? These are difficult and important questions for law
generally, and especially for a project like ours that takes doctrine seriously. It is of
course not hard to find examples where judges or Justices dispute whether the test cited
is the one being applied,67 and we are not so naïve or reductive to think that doctrinal
tests can be mechanically and determinatively reproduced in multiple areas. First
Amendment strict scrutiny might well be different from Fourteenth Amendment strict
scrutiny, for example.68
62

ZICK, supra note 2, at 29 (“The process [of Rights Dynamism] . . . . includes public
advocacy, the work of civic institutions and constitutional movements, legal scholarship,
policymaking relating to individual rights, and public discourse about rights.”); id. at 37–70
(analyzing the impact of the Free Speech Clause on the ability to discuss other rights).
63
See generally RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., IMPLEMENTING THE CONSTITUTION (2001).
64
ZICK, supra note 2, at 10.
65
Id. Doctrinal borrowing may, of course, eventually become self-justifying, with earlier
instances of doctrinal trade justifying later migrations.
66
See id. at 10–11.
67
See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 380 (2003) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting)
(“Although the Court recites the language of our strict scrutiny analysis, its application of
that review is unprecedented in its deference.”).
68
See Ashutosh Bhagwat, The Test That Ate Everything: Intermediate Scrutiny in First
Amendment Jurisprudence, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 783, 827 (2007) (noting the difference in the
First Amendment intermediate scrutiny test and the version of intermediate scrutiny applied
to equal protection claims); Adam Winkler, Fundamentally Wrong About Fundamental
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That, however, is a challenge for any study of borrowing, not just that involving
doctrine—what appears to be dynamism might simply be justificatory rhetoric. We
do not take that position, but neither can we disprove it. To the degree that one finds
it convincing, though, the questions transform, rather than disappear. Why do judges
invoke the same test in different areas if they are “actually” doing different things? If
the nature of the borrowed doctrine is irrelevant and rights borrow from one another
simply because of inertia or familiarity, is that really dynamic?
Again, our goal is not to offer a competing account to the study of rights. What
we propose is an inquiry that would deepen one particular aspect of that analysis—its
consideration of the doctrinal rules and standards that are themselves borrowed and
transplanted between rights. This is in many ways a subset of the dynamism that Zick
and others have described.69 But we think that the shift in emphasis matters: focusing
on the doctrine itself faces different challenges, and potentially yields different insights than foregrounding the rights themselves.
II. THE PROCESSES OF DOCTRINAL DYNAMISM: WHY DOCTRINES MIGRATE
Ideally, we would be able to place metaphorical radio collars on doctrinal rules
and track their movements, observing them as they adapt to—or reject—new habitats.
Doing so could help pinpoint what characteristics make some rules more adaptable
than others. Equally crucially, it might tell us something about the habitats (i.e., legal
contexts themselves). Lacking such surveillance, we can nonetheless identify at least
a few basic predicates for Doctrinal Dynamism.
In prior work on borrowing, scholars have already identified some of the possible preconditions. In her study of the exclusionary rule, Jennifer Laurin explores two:
“[F]it, meaning sufficient congruence between the source and target doctrines to
satisfy minimum principles of legal reasoning and jurisprudential legitimacy; and
motive, meaning some strategic impetus on the part of the Court to reach beyond doctrinal boundaries.”70 Tebbe and Tsai have a slightly different account, which is more
focused on the use of borrowing as a tool of persuasion:
How well different bodies of constitutional knowledge fit together
turns on a number of factors, including: (1) whether linkages between the areas already exist (synergy), and the duration of any
connections (novelty); (2) what the justifications for the appropriation are and how readily they might be embraced by specialists and
average citizens (persuasiveness); (3) how the synthesized values
are applied to the dispute at hand (practical yield); and (4) whether
Rights, 23 CONST. COMMENT. 227, 227–28 (2006) (noting that even fundamental rights vary
in the scrutiny they receive).
69
See ZICK, supra note 2, at 18.
70
Laurin, supra note 16, at 674 (emphasis added).
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and how other background conditions underlie a combination of
ideas (resource constraints, social environment, and the like).71
As both of these accounts suggest, some basic similarity between the rights is necessary but not sufficient for doctrinal borrowing to take place.
Again, Zick’s account of the process of constitutional borrowing is illustrative.72
As noted, that process of generalization and reasoning by analogy typically depends
on identifying some kind of underlying principle that two rights or rules have in
common.73 When that connective tissue is present, legal interpreters will probably
work harder (or, alternatively, will not have to work as hard) to shape or alter transplants so that they can “take.” A person who believes that the First and Second Amendments are relevantly similar will take a longer look at whether First Amendment
doctrines can or should be important in Second Amendment law.74 As always, the
question of relevant similarity (what Zick calls “general resemblance”75) is hard—
perhaps impossible76—to articulate. Rights can be similarly important (i.e., “equally
fundamental”), or exercised by similar groups of people,77 or even just proximate to
one another in the text of the Constitution. Perhaps, like family resemblance (in both
the common and philosophical accounts78), there is no single similarity that justifies
the borrowing, but rather a set of overlapping commonalities.
A particularly relevant similarity for the purposes of doctrinal borrowing may be
whether the rights were designed to prevent similar constitutional problems. Rights
that are similarly oriented will presumably be good candidates for borrowing. Matt
Adler has argued that, in fact, this is the whole point—the “moral structure”—of American constitutional rights law: “Constitutional rights are rights against rules. A constitutional right protects the rights-holder from a particular rule (a rule with the wrong
predicate or history); it does not protect a particular action of hers from all the rules
71

Tebbe & Tsai, supra note 6, at 495.
See supra notes 50–55 and accompanying text.
73
See ZICK, supra note 2, at 24–25 (discussing the common “coverage” of rights and this
utilized in Obergefell ).
74
See, e.g., Jordan E. Pratt, A First Amendment–Inspired Approach to Heller’s “Schools”
and “Government Buildings,” 92 NEB. L. REV. 537, 542 (2013) (arguing “that lessons from
First Amendment doctrine counsel in favor of a narrow interpretation of Heller’s schools and
government buildings” exceptions).
75
See ZICK, supra note 2, at 10.
76
See Frederick Schauer, Precedent, 39 STAN. L. REV. 571, 584 (1987) (“Think about why
power tools are sold in hardware stores rather than in electrical appliance shops. And think
about why we most often group red bicycles with bicycles of other colors rather than with
red ties and red meat.”).
77
District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 579–80 (2008) (analyzing the use of the
phrases “right of the people” and “the people” throughout the Constitution).
78
See, e.g., LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS 31–32 (G.E.M.
Anscombe trans., Blackwell Pub. 3d ed. 1967) (1953).
72
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under which the action falls.”79 On one version of this reading, one does not actually
have a “right” to do X, but rather, has a right against being prevented from doing X for
certain forbidden reasons. For example, even though the First Amendment covers flag
burning, there is no right to burn a flag free from legal sanction.80 A person who does
so can properly be fined for littering, or arson, or any number of other offenses.81 What
the right prevents is government sanctions imposed because of the content of the message communicated.82 The relevant rule, then—that content discrimination is subject
to strict scrutiny—targets the government action not the private action.83
Consider an example. It has sometimes been argued that the purpose of strict scrutiny is to “smoke out” invidious government purposes.84 This argument was first made
in the context of equal protection claims involving racial classifications—specifically,
to justify the application of strict scrutiny even to affirmative action plans and other
government programs designed to remedy or forestall racial discrimination and inequality.85 By the time it was articulated, strict scrutiny had already ventured out of equal
protection and into other areas, including free speech and some aspects of due process.86
But equal-protection cases are not the only ones that involve concerns about
smoking out government animus.87 It should be unsurprising, then, that strict scrutiny
79

Matthew D. Adler, Rights Against Rules: The Moral Structure of American Constitutional Law, 97 MICH. L. REV. 1, 3 (1998).
80
See generally Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989).
81
Adler, supra note 79, at 3–4.
82
Eugene Volokh, The “Speech Integral to Criminal Conduct” Exception, 101 CORNELL
L. REV. 981, 1010 (2016).
83
This is what Adler means by “rule,” whereas we’re generally using that word to refer
to the doctrine. See Adler, supra note 79, at 4–5.
84
See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Strict Judicial Scrutiny, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1267, 1309–10
(2007) (“In recent years, the Supreme Court has sometimes asserted unequivocally that strict
scrutiny aims to unmask forbidden motivations.”); see also id. at 1310 (“The purpose of strict
scrutiny, the Court said, was ‘to “smoke out” illegitimate uses of race’” (quoting Gutter v.
Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 326 (2003))). But see id. at 1310 (“Although it seems plain that the
Supreme Court sometimes deploys strict scrutiny as a motive test, it also seems indisputable
that the Court’s inquiries do not always focus on governmental purposes.”).
85
Grutter, 539 U.S. at 326 (“We apply strict scrutiny to all racial classifications to ‘“smoke
out” illegitimate uses of race by assuring that [government] is pursuing a goal important enough
to warrant use of a highly suspect tool.’” (alteration in original) (quoting City of Richmond
v. J.A. Croson Co. 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989))).
86
It is worth reiterating that the common refrain that strict scrutiny applies to restrictions
on fundamental rights is simply incorrect. As Adam Winkler notes, “Fundamental rights do
not trigger strict scrutiny, at least not all of the time. In fact, strict scrutiny—a standard of review
that asks if a challenged law is the least restrictive means of achieving compelling government
objectives—is actually applied quite rarely in fundamental rights cases.” Winkler, supra note 68,
at 227. Many fundamental rights, including the right to an abortion, do not receive the protections
of strict scrutiny. See generally Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (reaffirming that the right involved is fundamental, and yet applying an “undue burden” standard).
87
See generally ARAIZA, supra note 21.
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applies in other areas where the government’s motivations may be suspect.88 Depending
on one’s frame of reference, this tells us something about the rights themselves—
that they are rights against being targeted by the government for an illegitimate
reason—and something about the doctrinal rule—that courts have thought it to be
a useful tool to smoke out such animus. This enables deeper normative analysis (is
strict scrutiny well-suited for this task?) as well as a potential predictive theory about
where the doctrine may travel next, if anywhere. For instance, perhaps the welldocumented89 (and in some quarters, much-maligned90) reluctance of courts to exercise
strict scrutiny in Second Amendment cases is because those courts believe that the
government motive in enforcing gun regulations truly is public safety, rather than
anti-gun bias.
A. The Marketplace of Doctrine: Why Some Doctrines Dominate
Not all rights lend and borrow doctrinal rules at the same rates. Some, like the
First Amendment, have generated many rules that were subsequently adopted and
applied in other areas of constitutional law.91 Others, like the Second, are importers
only.92 What accounts for the success of the First Amendment—and others like the
Fourteenth—as exporters of doctrinal rules?93 Conversely, do doctrines with trade
deficits, like the Second Amendment, share common characteristics?
These are different questions than the one that scholars (including Zick94) have
often asked—explicitly or implicitly—about what accounts for the First Amendment’s
magnetism.95 The magnetism or dominance of the Free Speech Clause is undoubtedly on display when claims are coded as involving free speech when they might
88

See Kagan, supra note 32, at 414 (“[N]otwithstanding the Court’s protestations in
O’Brien, . . . First Amendment law, as developed by the Supreme Court over the past several
decades, has as its primary, though unstated, object the discovery of improper governmental
motives.”); Winkler, supra note 48, at 803 (“The hunt for improper motives has also animated strict scrutiny in the First Amendment . . . .”).
89
Ruben & Blocher, supra note 19, at 1495 (documenting that strict scrutiny was applied
in 27 out of 1,153 analyzed Second Amendment cases).
90
See Timothy Zick, The Second Amendment as a Fundamental Right, 46 HASTINGS
CONST. L.Q. 621, 622 (2019) (documenting and analyzing claims that the Second Amendment
is not being afforded the respect it deserves, including that “the absence of strict scrutiny is
demonstrative of lower-class status”).
91
ZICK, supra note 2, at 205 (stating Free Speech has created “discourse regarding Second
Amendment right”).
92
Id. at 206–07 (discussing how debate regarding the Second Amendment has been about
internal interpretation and not about application to other rights).
93
In one obvious sense—incorporation—the Fourteenth Amendment is probably the most
prolific importer of doctrine in the Constitution.
94
Id. at 7 (“[T]he Free Speech Clause is a uniquely magnetic rights provision.”).
95
See generally Frederick Schauer, The Politics and Incentives of First Amendment
Coverage, 56 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1613 (2015).
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instead (and more properly) be treated as involving petition, assembly, or even free
exercise.96 Likewise, the tendency to invoke the First Amendment in political rhetoric
both demonstrates and bolsters the status of free speech as first among equals within
the Bill of Rights.97 One might explain this kind of dominance in any number of ways:
the fact that most Americans perceive themselves as exercising the right to free speech
far more than basically any other constitutional right,98 the strength of the cultural
mythology involving speech,99 and so on.
But we are looking at the phenomenon from a different angle: the transmission
of doctrinal rules from one area to another, including the use in non-speech cases
of rules that were created to adjudicate speech cases. This phenomenon might happen
without the original home of the rule ever being invoked, or at least not invoked
after the initial migration of the rule. In any event, since the transfer primarily occurs
in case reporters rather than in public discourse, it is a bit harder to explain it using
the same accounts of general public commitment. The fact that free speech is publicly
celebrated may help account for its overall magnetism, but is less useful in exploring
the tendency of judges to borrow its doctrines, which are not likely to have any particular valence in public discourse.
One way to conceptualize the inquiry is as a kind of “marketplace of doctrine”—a
competitive environment in which judges are basically the consumers and will select
rules that best answer the questions they confront. Perhaps, for example, strict scrutiny
has spread across doctrinal domains because it does a good job capturing a widely
shared judicial belief that some kind of stringent means-end scrutiny is appropriate
for any potential infringement on a fundamental right. Its pervasiveness is a demonstration of its value.
Because judges are the ones ultimately responsible for selecting doctrinal rules
for application in new cases,100 their preferences determine the value of doctrinal
96

ZICK, supra note 2, at 1.
On the first page of his book, Zick quotes the Supreme Court’s statement that freedom
of speech “is the matrix, the indispensable condition, of nearly every other form of freedom.”
Id. (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 327 (1937)). Other rights have laid claim
to that title, however. Some gun rights supporters call the Second Amendment “America’s First
Freedom.” That is, in fact, the title of the NRA’s magazine. See Kaley v. United States, 134
S. Ct. 1090, 1107 (2014) (calling the right to counsel “the most precious right a defendant has,
because it is his attorney who will fight for the other rights the defendant enjoys”).
98
Indeed, we suspect—though this is not the place to explore—that the varying reach and
strength of constitutional rights might be explained in large part by the degree to which they are,
or understood to be, either exercised by many people (free speech) or at least exercised for the
benefit of the whole (bearing arms to deter a tyrannical government, in some conceptions). As
Zick notes, the “sheer prevalence of communicative activity” may help account for the fact
that the Free Speech Clause is a “uniquely magnetic rights provision.” ZICK, supra note 2, at 7.
99
See generally Frederick Schauer, The Wily Agitator and the American Free Speech Tradition, 57 STAN. L. REV. 2157 (2005) (reviewing GEOFFREY R. STONE, PERILOUS TIMES: FREE
SPEECH IN WARTIME: FROM THE SEDITION ACT OF 1798 TO THE WAR ON TERRORISM (2004)).
100
See Scalia, supra note 14, at 1176–77.
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rules. This suggests that, in considering the likelihood and success of constitutional
borrowing, attention must be paid to the jurisprudential preferences of judges. This
is different from focusing on their interpretive philosophies, which are generally
understood to involve the process of finding meaning in constitutional provisions.101
To oversimplify a bit, the interpretive debates are about inputs: how much to rely on
history, precedent, social movements, and the like.102 The debate about originalism
is, among other things, a debate about interpretive philosophy.
The kind of preferences we have in mind involve outputs: the doctrines that judges
design to implement constitutional meaning. The debate about rules and standards,
for instance, is a debate about doctrinal preferences.103 Of course, interpretation and
implementation may be closely related, and certain philosophical inclinations are likely
to correlate to certain doctrinal preferences.104 Still, doctrinal design may be influenced by a different set of considerations, including judges’ comfort with discretion,
their commitment to “minimalism,” their confidence about their interpretive conclusions, and so on.105
Of course, we cannot rule out the possibility that such transplantation occurs
simply as a matter of reflex—judges cite the rules with which they are familiar (like
the tiers of scrutiny, perhaps) without any particular consideration of whether those
rules perform their job well.106 The same could be said of rights themselves; judges
rely on the First Amendment to interpret the Second because the former is familiar.
Still, we think that the familiarity—the very fact that the tiers have been used in so
many contexts—suggests something about their perceived utility for specific tasks,
as does the fact that they are not borrowed in other areas.
Another way to understand the “market” is as one where litigants are the consumers. After all, judges can—within limitations—select doctrines to resolve cases,107
but they have little control over the cases that they will hear, or the claims that will
be involved. Litigants’ preferences about doctrine are more straightforward than that
101

See ZICK, supra note 2, at 7.
See id.
103
See, e.g., Scalia, supra note 14, at 1179 (arguing that adopting clear rules constrains
judges from acting on their political preferences in future cases based on balancing); Schauer,
supra note 46 (contrasting rules- and content-based approaches to decision-making); Pierre
Schlag, Rules and Standards, 33 UCLA L. REV. 379, 398 (1985) (“The dialectic here [of rules
v. standards] traces the so-called balancing v. absolutism debate.”).
104
See Michael C. Dorf, The Undead Constitution, 125 HARV. L. REV. 2011, 2026 (2012)
(reviewing JACK M. BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM (2011); DAVID A. STRAUSS, THE LIVING
CONSTITUTION (2010)) (noting “expected-application originalism’s substitution of rules for
standards and principles”).
105
See generally Greene, supra note 50.
106
See Transcript of Oral Argument at 44, District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570
(2008) (No. 07-290) (Chief Justice Roberts stating that the phrases utilized in tiers of scrutiny
analysis do not “appear in the Constitution” and “just kind of developed over the years as sort
of baggage that the First Amendment picked up”).
107
See Scalia, supra note 14, at 1176–77.
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of judges because in nearly every instance their overriding goal is simply to win.108
They will therefore seek out and claim whatever doctrinal mantle is most likely to
help them prevail.109
For constitutional plaintiffs, this generally means invoking the highest level of
scrutiny (i.e., the most stringent rule), regardless of whether doing so is intuitive in
other ways. Free exercise claims are an obvious example here.110 Owing in part to
Employment Division v. Smith,111 the Free Exercise Clause is not always an attractive
tool for plaintiffs. Thus, as Zick notes, “starting in the 1980s, in both their general
advocacy and litigation of specific cases, religious liberty advocates started to abandon
the Free Exercise Clause in favor of the Free Speech Clause.”112 The story is complicated, of course, but the motivation is relatively simple: litigants prefer winning doctrines, which generally means those that would subject government action to the most
demanding standards.113
Over time, this kind of preferencing can have ill effects, not least because it can
stunt the doctrinal growth of the less-stringently protected right—shifting attention
and doctrinal development to the Free Speech Clause instead of the Free Exercise
Clause, for example.114 In doing so, it can also distort the very meaning of the subsumed
right. Take, for instance, the assembly clause of the First Amendment.115 Scholars
have convincingly argued (and some have bemoaned the fact) that the intended right—a
broad protection for peaceable flesh and blood assemblies of persons—has in practice been repealed and replaced with a narrower but perhaps stronger right of expressive association.116
108

Frederick Schauer, The Boundaries of the First Amendment: A Preliminary Exploration
of Constitutional Salience, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1765, 1795 (2004).
109
See id.
110
U.S. CONST. amend. I.
111
494 U.S. 872 (1990).
112
ZICK, supra note 2, at 33. Schauer adds that litigants are drawn to the Free Speech
Clause for its rhetorical power as well as it being a winner. See Schauer, supra note 108, at
1795 (referencing the First Amendment’s magnetism).
113
As Carlos Ball’s contribution to this symposium illustrates, the choice can be especially hard for a movement that invokes principles and doctrines which might also, in other
contexts, be adverse to its interests. See Carlos A. Ball, Gender-Stereotyping Theory, Freedom
of Expression, and Identity, 28 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 229 (2019); see also Elizabeth
Sepper, Sex Segregation, Economic Opportunity, and Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 28 WM. &
MARY BILL RTS. J. 489 (2019).
114
Whether or not a case “should” have been analyzed under the Free Exercise Clause or
the Free Speech Clause, if only one, is of course a matter of debate. See, e.g., Widmar v.
Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981) (holding that a public university policy excluding religious
groups from open forum policy violated the Free Speech Clause).
115
U.S. CONST. amend. I.
116
See, e.g., John D. Inazu, The Forgotten Freedom of Assembly, 84 TUL. L. REV. 565, 566
(2010); John D. Inazu, The Unsettling “Well-Settled” Law of Freedom of Association, 43
CONN. L. REV. 149, 174 (2010); Nicholas S. Brod, Note, Rethinking a Reinvigorated Right
to Assemble, 63 DUKE L.J. 155, 159 (2013).
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B. The Necessity of Doctrinal Diversity
Other contexts that can involve “borrowing”—whether financial or cultural—
often raise the question of whether such borrowing can or will lead to homogeneity
and the domination of weak or minority characteristics.117 This is a particular concern
when it comes to Zick’s muse, the Free Speech Clause, because it has such a tendency
to dominate other rights. As Zick notes, “[I]n all of its various forms, expansionism
tends to standardize constitutional rights. . . . This standardization reduces or eliminates the conceptual space between constitutional rights, which in turn reduces or
eliminates opportunities for synergy and mutual illumination.”118
That said, there might be something to celebrate about a vision of law in which
the same rules can be deployed in various legal contexts. Few people complain about
the law being too simple, after all. Anything that reduces the dizzying area of multifactor tests and context-specific exceptions might be welcome, either because it makes
legal doctrine more accessible and manageable,119 or because it represents a distillation of some essential characteristics of rights.
But convergence of doctrine has downsides, inasmuch as it can lead to flat standardization and the merging of conceptually distinct rights.120 After all, the marketplace
metaphor only works when there are enough different products, ideas, or doctrines
to generate competition. A doctrine-monopsony in which the First Amendment is
the only producer would not be much of a “market.” At the doctrinal level, dynamism
depends on some kind of diversity. This is consistent with what Zick calls “Rights
Pluralism,” which “is based on the simple premise that liberty is more secure insofar
as governments are subject to multiple, independent, and substantively robust constitutional limitations.”121
One possible path to maintaining Rights Pluralism in a world of standardized
doctrine would be to increase the total weight given to the liberty interests at stake
when multiple rights are at issue, as David Faigman has suggested.122 Under such
a regime, a law that threatens both free speech and free exercise would therefore be
less likely constitutional than one that reached just one or the other.123 And even if
117

See ZICK, supra note 2, at xiii.
See id. at 247.
119
Cf. Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Optimal Standardization in the Law of
Property: The Numerus Clausus Principle, 110 YALE L.J. 1 (2000).
120
Along the same lines, Laurin distinguishes between the initial act of borrowing and
what she calls convergence—“the merging, functionally if not formally, of two previously independent remedial paths into one.” Laurin, supra note 16, at 674.
121
See ZICK, supra note 2, at 15.
122
See generally David L. Faigman, Measuring Constitutionality Transactionally, 45
HASTINGS L.J. 753 (1994).
123
See id. at 773 (“If the full effect of the constitutional infringement is assessed against
the government interest . . . the action would be deemed unconstitutional.”).
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two applicable rights involve the same doctrinal rule, there might be marginal differences in how that rule applies: what counts as a “compelling” government interest
for purposes of due process might not count for purposes of equal protection claims,
and vice versa.124
With these exceptions and caveats, however, it is worth considering the ways
in which doctrinal borrowing can effectively limit Rights Dynamism by facilitating
the colonization of one right by another. Sometimes a court must decide whether a
case should be treated as involving Right X or Right Y or both.125 Those decisions can
have significant impacts both in particular cases and, over time, the gradual but now
almost-complete displacement of the rights of petition and assembly by free speech
is one particularly notable example that Zick explains in detail.126
But that is not the only way that one right can displace another. A right can “colonize” without actual annexation, simply by exporting its own doctrine.127 The colonized
right will continue to be invoked, but it will look and act like the colonizer.128 Again,
the First Amendment provides a particularly good illustration of the difference between these two modes of doctrinal imperialism.129 Many scholars and commentators have described or bemoaned what they see as First Amendment expansionism130
or weaponization.131 For many, the concern is that cases involving economic regulations
are instead being classified as involving free speech, leading to a kind of “Lochnerization” in which basic financial and safety regulations are subject to heightened scrutiny
and struck down.132 This is fundamentally a concern about coverage—about what
kinds of cases fall within the First Amendment.
But what if, instead of pulling cases within it, the First Amendment simply
exported its doctrines to other areas? Would the Lochnerization concern be allayed
124

See id. at 770.
It seems unlikely that rights can borrow doctrinal tests when it comes to questions of
coverage—those tests are likely to be completely unique to particular rights, to the degree
that they can be articulated at all. See Schauer, supra note 108. Thus, as we argue infra
Section III.C, citations to coverage doctrines from another right are not truly “borrowing,”
because nothing of content is being borrowed; the citation is rhetorical.
126
See ZICK, supra note 2, at 71.
127
See id. at 9 (describing how the Free Exercise Clause has been litigated through the
framework of Free Speech).
128
Supra note 127 and accompanying text.
129
The metaphor is not ours alone; Zick himself argues that “the Free Speech Clause has
effectively colonized constitutional territory that rightfully belongs to non-speech guarantees.”
ZICK, supra note 2, at 8.
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See generally Leslie Kendrick, First Amendment Expansionism, 56 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 1199 (2015).
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Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, City, & Mun. Emps., Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 2448, 2501
(2018) (Kagan, J., dissenting).
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See, e.g., Jeremy K. Kessler, The Early Years of First Amendment Lochnerism, 116
COLUM. L. REV. 1915 (2016).
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if, say, the Court declined to treat a credit card surcharge labeling requirement as a
content-specific speech restriction subject to heightened scrutiny,133 but reached the
same conclusion under due process (which, after all, applies to economic transactions,
albeit not with such bite134)? If two rights have the same triggers and the same doctrinal
apparatus—a blending that could potentially be achieved through doctrinal borrowing
alone, and not just through explicit expansion of a dominant right’s domain—in what
meaningful sense are they legally distinct?
III. WHEN DOCTRINES STAY HOME
Good comparative work—especially work on borrowing—must consider not only
what is taken, but also what is not. It is easy, Lee Epstein and Jack Knight point out,
to focus only on successful legal transplants, thereby falling victim to selection bias.135
In order to have a complete picture, one must also attend to the transplants that were
never made. For our purposes, that means identifying doctrinal rules that one might
expect to travel from one area to another but have not, or which are in extreme cases
uniquely tied to a single constitutional right.
We can then ask the same basic question: why don’t these rules travel? Some might
be relevant only to limited factual situations (the criminal procedure rights, for example), or might target a limited kind of government wrong (the chilling effect,
perhaps136), and so on. But contextual differences, while important, cannot alone
account for all doctrinal immobility. The reasons that doctrine stays put are as varied
as the reasons it moves.
A. Purposes
Some doctrinal rules address concerns that are more or less unique to a particular right. Consider the First Amendment’s prohibition on prior restraint—a rule that
is specific to free-speech doctrine.137 It says that the government generally cannot
prohibit speech, but can only punish it.138 This rule is deeply rooted in the particular
133

See Expressions Hair Design v. Schneiderman, 137 S. Ct. 1144, 1147 (2017) (holding
that credit card surcharge labeling requirements regulated commercial speech).
134
See id. at 1147, 1152 (remanding case to decide free speech issue, but holding law did
not violate Due Process Clause as unconstitutionally vague).
135
Lee Epstein & Jack Knight, Constitutional Borrowing and Nonborrowing, 1 INT’L J.
CONST. L. 196, 197 (2003) (“[M]any studies of constitutional borrowing . . . ‘select on the
dependent variable,’ that is, they typically focus on when the phenomenon occurs—when
and why society B ‘borrows’ a formal constitutional provision, a court precedent, and so on
from society A—and ignore when and why it does not occur . . . .”).
136
See ZICK, supra note 2, at 235 (doubting relevance of expressive “chill” arguments in
Second Amendment cases).
137
See, e.g., Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 657, 722–23 (1931).
138
Id.
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history of the First Amendment,139 and is mostly designed to address speech-specific
concerns: the chilling effect of sanctions, the likelihood of viewpoint discrimination,
the need for speech to check the government, and so on.140
Recently, some gun-rights advocates have argued that prior restraint rules should
be imported into Second Amendment doctrine.141 If accepted, such a rule would
effectively render licensing of any kind constitutionally suspect, and perhaps even
impermissible.142 But courts have universally rejected the argument on precisely the
basis described here: the rule serves purposes that simply are not present in the context
of the Second Amendment.143 As Zick puts it, the Amendments “pertain to very different activities, serve distinct purposes, and raise disparate regulatory concerns.”144
But others argue that the Amendments do share relevant similarities.145 Both
protect fundamental rights after all, and some argue that they both protect “tools of
political dissent.”146 In keeping with this comparison, some claim that the Second
Amendment is being treated as “second class.”147 Among their main complaints is
the refusal of courts to apply strict scrutiny to Second Amendment claims.148
139

See Jeffery A. Smith, Prior Restraint: Original Intentions and Modern Interpretations,
28 WM. & MARY L. REV. 439, 459–61 (1987) (noting that the original interpretation of the
First Amendment’s guarantee was “freedom from prior restraint but not from postpublication
punishment,” as derived from the reasoning of Sir William Blackstone).
140
See generally Thomas I. Emerson, The Doctrine of Prior Restraint, 20 L. & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 648 (1955).
141
E.g., Kachalsky v. Cty. of Westchester, 701 F.3d 81, 91 (2d Cir. 2012) (“Plaintiffs . . .
suggest that we apply First Amendment prior-restraint analysis in lieu of means-end scrutiny
to assess the proper cause requirement” of a gun licensing scheme.).
142
See id.
143
E.g., id. at 92.
144
ZICK, supra note 2, at 203.
145
David B. Kopel, Trust the People: The Case Against Gun Control, 3 J. ON FIREARMS
& PUB. POL’Y 77, 103 (1990) (referring to guns); see also Kopel, supra note 57, at 418 (“[T]he
First and Second Amendments both protect fundamental aspects of individual autonomy
against government suppression.”).
146
See supra note 145 and accompanying text.
147
Friedman v. City of Highland Park, 136 S. Ct. 447, 450 (2015) (Thomas, J., dissenting
from the denial of certiorari) (“I would grant certiorari to prevent the Seventh Circuit from
relegating the Second Amendment to a second-class right.”); see also Silvester v. Becerra,
138 S. Ct. 945, 945 (2018) (Thomas, J., dissenting from the denial of certiorari) (claiming
that the decision below was “symptomatic of the lower courts’ general failure to afford the
Second Amendment the respect due an enumerated constitutional right” and that “the Second
Amendment is a disfavored right in this Court”).
148
See, e.g., Lawrence Rosenthal & Joyce Lee Malcolm, McDonald v. Chicago: Which Standard of Scrutiny Should Apply to Gun Control Laws?, 105 NW. U. L. REV. 437, 455 (2011)
(“Since fundamental rights are not to be separated into first- and second-class status, the strict
scrutiny applied to the First Amendment freedom of the press and freedom of speech should also
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press is generally absorbed by the freedom of speech, supra note 3 and accompanying text,
and that strict scrutiny does not apply to all free speech claims. Supra note 19.
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One response to this argument is that strict scrutiny is ill-suited to Second Amendment claims because it would overprotect gun rights. But that argument rests on the
same normative premise that is in dispute: the extent to which gun rights should be
protected. An alternative answer, founded in doctrinal analysis and not premised on
a normative assumption about gun rights, lies in the fact that strict scrutiny is designed
for particular tasks that are not relevant in the gun rights context, such as smoking
out government animus,149 or correcting political process failure.150
Here, too, there might be push-back, but the disagreement is more tractable. Some
opponents of gun regulation believe that there is widespread bias against guns151—
comparisons to Nazi Germany are uncommon,152 but apocalyptic rhetoric is not.153
As an empirical matter, however, it is hard to find support for the notion that gun rights
are truly under attack in politics, let alone in courts.154 The vast majority of Americans support Heller’s interpretation of the right to keep and bear arms,155 as do both
major political parties and powerful advocacy organizations.156 To be sure, some
Americans still support extreme gun control like handgun bans, but their numbers
are relatively small.157 And, perhaps more relevantly, they were politically weak even
149

ARAIZA, supra note 21, at 3–4.
Id.
151
See, e.g., JOHN R. LOTT, JR., THE BIAS AGAINST GUNS: WHY ALMOST EVERYTHING
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/?p=5239 [https://perma.cc/S4RJ-9RLS] (“Propaganda about gun owners has reached a fever
pitch in America today, leaving American gun owners feeling like the Jews in Germany
before the Second World War.”). See generally Bernard E. Harcourt, On Gun Registration,
the NRA, Adolf Hitler, and Nazi Gun Laws: Exploding the Gun Culture Wars (a Call to
Historians), 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 653 (2004) (exploring the longstanding argument made
by gun-rights advocates that gun control led to the Holocaust).
153
Blocher, supra note 59, at 819–25 (collecting examples).
154
Again, Zick’s work is instructive. See Zick, supra note 90, at 622. To be sure, it is also
hard to empirically show that gun rights are not treated as second class. Compare Ruben &
Blocher, supra note 19, at 1496 (suggesting that low success rates of Second Amendment
claims are primarily due to their weakness), and Adam M. Samaha & Roy Germano, Is the
Second Amendment a Second-Class Right?, 68 DUKE L.J. ONLINE 57, 58–59 (2018) (concluding that data do not support the “second class” argument), with David B. Kopel, Data
Indicate Second Amendment Underenforcement, 68 DUKE L.J. ONLINE 79 (2018) (generally
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before Heller took such preferences off the table158—D.C. and Chicago were the only
notable cities with handgun bans,159 and they were struck down in Heller and McDonald.160 Some have called for these cases to be overturned,161 or the Second Amendment to be repealed,162 but the position commands little support163—not even the
major gun violence prevention groups have staked out such a position.164 In short, it
is hard to identify either the kind of political process failure or government animus
towards guns and gun owners that might justify strict scrutiny or anything like it.165
Of course, the government must respect the individual right set forth in Heller,
which limits its ability to regulate.166 But overzealousness in pursuing a legitimate
regulatory goal is not the same as bias or intolerance, and the paradigm cases in the
gun rights arena will involve mere incompetence in understanding constitutional
limits. And in those situations, some kind of proportionality review is generally to
be favored.167 It is thus appropriate and unsurprising that courts are more frequently
2012), http://news.gallup.com/poll/159569/americans-stricter-gun-laws-oppose-bans.aspx
[https://perma.cc/RAS9-VGXU] (finding that twenty-four percent of Americans favor banning
the possession of handguns).
158
Jones, supra note 155.
159
Steve Chapman, Opinion, Chicago’s Pointless Handgun Ban, CHI. TRIB. (Mar. 4, 2010),
https://www.chicagotribune.com/news/ct-xpm-2010-03-04-ct-oped-0304-chapman-20100304
-column-story.html [https://perma.cc/5LCC-LH7Y].
160
McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 748 (2010); District of Columbia v. Heller,
554 U.S. 570, 636 (2008).
161
See, e.g., Richard Aborn & Marlene Koury, Toward a Future, Wiser Court: A Blueprint
for Overturning District of Columbia v. Heller, 39 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1353 (2012).
162
See, e.g., Bret Stephens, Opinion, Repeal the Second Amendment, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 5,
2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/05/opinion/guns-second-amendment-nra.html [https://
perma.cc/NK4T-B8AU]; John Paul Stevens, Opinion, John Paul Stevens: Repeal the Second
Amendment, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 27, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/27/opinion
/john-paul-stevens-repeal-second-amendment.html [https://perma.cc/45SJ-R7MF].
163
Christopher Ingraham, One in Five Americans Wants the Second Amendment Repealed,
National Survey Says, WASH. POST (Mar. 27, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news
/wonk/wp/2018/03/27/one-in-five-americans-want-the-second-amendment-to-be-repealed
-national-survey-finds/ [https://perma.cc/8UQ4-WM47].
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See id.
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REV. 246, 260 (2008) (“There is no special reason for an aggressive judicial role in protecting
against gun control, in light of the fact that opponents of such control have considerable political
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Posner, In Defense of Looseness, NEW REPUBLIC (Aug. 27, 2008), https://newrepublic.com/ar
ticle/62124/defense-looseness [https://perma.cc/X6D2-3849] (“The proper time . . . to enlarge
constitutional restrictions on government action is when the group seeking the enlargement
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relying on intermediate scrutiny than strict scrutiny in addressing Second Amendment claims.168
At a broader level, what this suggests is that the more generalized the concern
(i.e., government animus) that a right is designed to address, the more likely its doctrine
is to be borrowed—the doctrine is a tool for a common task. Conversely, rights designed to address unique or narrow concerns are less likely to engage in Doctrinal
Dynamism, and will do so only when those narrow concerns are found elsewhere.
B. Predicates and Context
There is another way in which an examination of rule design may explain a lack
of doctrinal migration: not because of differences in purpose, but because of narrow
or even unique predicates for a rule’s application. It may not be that the rights serve
different principles or values, but that the rights serve those principles or values in
unique contexts, and that the right’s doctrine reveals that distinction by not migrating.
It makes no sense, for instance, to ask why the Confrontation Clause has had little
impact on the Establishment Clause. The right to confront one’s accuser, like the
right against double jeopardy, cannot be made generic. The contexts are just too different to sensibly imagine moving doctrines from one to the other.
For example, the Fourth Amendment’s guarantee against unreasonable search
and seizure could be characterized as a protection against animus, in that it protects
against searches motivated by ill intent.169 At the very least, the good faith exception
means that the Amendment generally permits evidence to be presented so long as there
is not ill intent.170 But strict scrutiny has never been applied to the Fourth Amendment,
despite some scholarly urging.171 Strict scrutiny, as a tool, might just not work for the
Fourth Amendment right; after all, the government’s need to obtain evidence to prosecute a crime is almost certainly “compelling,” and a search is likely the only, let alone
the most narrowly tailored, way to get that evidence.172 Whether a particular kind of
168

Ruben & Blocher, supra note 19, at 1496 (“Intermediate scrutiny has been the most
prevalent form of scrutiny, no matter which category of court one considers. . . . [W]hen
levels-of-scrutiny analysis is applied, federal appellate courts select intermediate scrutiny 79
percent of the time.”).
169
See Utah v. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. 2056, 2063 (2016) (declining to suppress evidence and
noting a lack of flagrantly unlawful police misconduct).
170
See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 897–99 (1984).
171
See, e.g., Christopher Slobogin, Let’s Not Bury Terry: A Call for Rejuvenation of the Proportionality Principle, 72 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 1053, 1089 (1998) (arguing that “Fourth Amendment analysis should mimic equal protection rationality review ‘with bite,’ if not strict scrutiny”);
Scott E. Sundby, A Return to Fourth Amendment Basics: Undoing the Mischief of Camara and
Terry, 72 MINN. L. REV. 383, 386 (1988) (arguing for “replac[ing] the Court’s vague reasonableness balancing test with a strict scrutiny standard” in Fourth Amendment cases).
172
See Cynthia Lee, Package Bombs, Footlockers, and Laptops: What the Disappearing
Container Doctrine Can Tell Us About the Fourth Amendment, 100 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
1403, 1491 (2010) (“If all Fourth Amendment claims are subject to strict scrutiny, either all
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search is the least intrusive means available is a question with a little more there there,
but that requirement has been repeatedly rejected by the Court.173 Context dictates:
it might simply be too much to ask for investigators to always craft the least intrusive
means. And so the Fourth Amendment retains a reasonableness test, despite the theoretical applicability of strict scrutiny.174
The context limitations of rights and doctrine should not be taken too far, however.
In keeping with the point about levels of generality described above,175 many rules
can be stated or restated in ways that make them applicable in a broader set of contexts.
Even rules that might seem rooted to one doctrine might nonetheless be used—
perhaps through analogy—either directly or indirectly to build rules in another.176
The ability of a doctrine to migrate therefore depends in great part on the level
of specificity at which that doctrine can be articulated. It also depends on which principles are foregrounded and which are backgrounded, and at what level of specificity
the principles can be articulated.
For example, instead of asking why the tiers of scrutiny have not been imported
to the criminal procedure rights, one could also ask why those rights have not exported their doctrines. The absence of doctrinal importation does not necessarily
explain the absence of exports from those rights. Many predicates of doctrinal migration
are present in those rights: generalizable principles, apparent attractiveness to judges,
and a body of doctrine no less developed (and no less coherent177) than active exporters
like the First Amendment. And yet, for instance, there is no First Amendment version
of the exclusionary rule.
Dan Coenen thinks that there should be, or at least that there should be something
like one.178 He argues for “judicial recognition of a new set of First Amendment
but a few government searches would be deemed unreasonable or strict scrutiny would not
end up being very strict.”).
173
City of Ontario v. Quon, 560 U.S. 746, 763 (2010) (“This Court has repeatedly refused
to declare that only the least intrusive search practicable can be reasonable under the Fourth
Amendment.”) (internal quotation marks omitted).
174
See supra notes 171–73 and accompanying text.
175
See supra notes 46–56 and accompanying text.
176
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especially those involving government speech. See, e.g., Robert D. Kamenshine, The First
Amendment’s Implied Political Establishment Clause, 67 CALIF. L. REV. 1104 (1979); Nelson
Tebbe, Government Nonendorsement, 98 MINN. L. REV. 648 (2013). To be clear, the argument
here is that free speech doctrine should import the Establishment Clause’s neutrality requirement, not that religious government speech violates the Establishment Clause—which
it might, of course.
177
See Robert Post, Recuperating First Amendment Doctrine, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1249,
1270 (1995) (“In fact I would go so far as to say that the Court’s First Amendment jurisprudence, which is a lively and growing area of constitutional law, dances now macabrely on
the edge of complete doctrinal disintegration.”).
178
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protections that operate whenever challenged past-speech evidence involves expression
on a matter of public concern.”179 In fact, Coenen provides persuasive evidence that
the First Amendment and the Fourth Amendment must take each other into account:
the Supreme Court’s instruction to “examine what is ‘unreasonable’” in the Fourth
Amendment context “in the light of the values of freedom of expression.”180 For our
purposes, this would represent a potentially useful instance of Doctrinal Dynamism.
C. Rights-Constitutive Rules
If it is true that rights with identical triggers and rules are functionally identical,
that suggests something important about the relationship between rules and rights:
doctrinal rules not only implement rights, but help constitute them. Some rules are,
in other words, so deeply intertwined with particular rights that they must be understood, for all intents and purposes, as being “part” of that right.181 This has implications for the theory and practice of constitutional rights.
Any taxonomy—whether involving rights and rules or flora and fauna—must
reckon with the relationship between characteristics and the things that possess those
characteristics. Some characteristics and similarities may be cosmetic, in the sense
that they could be changed without forcing a reclassification. A rose can be pink, or
red, or yellow, and still be a rose. Other characteristics (thorns, etc.) might be essential.
A natural implication of any approach that sees rights and their enforcement as
distinct,182 is that the right is the “thing” (the rose, as it were) and doctrine is just one
of its characteristics (the color, for example). On this account, doctrine is basically
a cosmetic feature—it can change without really altering anything fundamental about
the right. The freedom of speech is what it is, whether protected by strict scrutiny or
intermediate scrutiny or a test based purely on historical analogy.
But this clear division between right and doctrine is unsatisfying because some
rules are so tightly bound up with rights that they cannot be changed without violating
the essence of the right. This is true, for example, of the rules that are themselves textually specified. A Fifth Amendment that permitted takings without just compensation
would be a fundamentally different right.183
179

Id.; see also Daniel J. Solove, The First Amendment as Criminal Procedure, 82 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 112, 176 (2007) (arguing “that First Amendment criminal procedure is both justified
and necessary to prevent the infringement of First Amendment rights in the course of
government investigations”).
180
Coenen, supra note 178, at 680 n.188 (quoting Roaden v. Kentucky, 413 U.S. 496, 504
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181
See infra note 183 and accompanying text.
182
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About the Irrational: The Roberts Court and the Future of Constitutional Law, 86 WASH. L. REV.
217, 234 (2011); Ernest A. Young, Popular Constitutionalism and the Underenforcement
Problem: The Case of the National Healthcare Law, 75 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 157 (2012).
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But there are other doctrines that might be essential to a right without necessarily
being textually specified. Would the First Amendment still be the First Amendment
without a requirement of viewpoint neutrality?184 Would equal protection still be
equal protection if suspect racial classifications were not subject to strict scrutiny?185
These are judge-made doctrines, but many would regard them as essential to our
understanding of those particular rights.
The answers to these questions have serious implications for theories of constitutional interpretation. Some scholars have posited a difference between “interpretation”
and “construction.”186 The former refers to the process of determining the meaning of
a constitutional provision,187 the latter to the creation of doctrines with which to implement it.188 But if some doctrinal rules are so inextricably intertwined with rights that
they cannot be separated, then the line between interpretation and construction will
collapse. Doctrinal borrowing (or lack thereof) might be a uniquely useful way to
identify and illustrate the phenomenon. Where a particular right does not borrow doctrines, it might be because its home-cooked doctrines are tightly interwoven with its
meaning, such that altering them would effectively mean reinterpreting the right.
On the other side of the spectrum, there may be some doctrinal tests that are essential to the very nature of rights adjudication. Courts applying these tests in a novel
context might cite earlier cases involving different rights, but doing so is not truly
borrowing. For example, Schauer has noted that questions about coverage and protection are inherent in any constitutional guarantee.189 In order to litigate a right, litigants and judges have to know what the right covers and what it does not, and what
the strength of its coverage is. For example, although coverage questions are rarely debated in the Sixth Amendment context, what counts as a “criminal prosecution” in
which a person is entitled to effective assistance of counsel is a coverage inquiry.190
Similarly, it is not hard to imagine coverage questions coming up with respect to
even inert rights like the one guaranteed in the Third Amendment: what counts as “in
time of peace” versus “in time of war,” what counts as a “house,” who is the “Owner,”
what counts as “consent,” who are “Soldier[s]” prohibited from being quartered?191
qualify the right. It rested upon the Fifth Amendment. Statutory recognition was not necessary.
A promise to pay was not necessary. Such a promise was implied because of the duty to pay
imposed by the Amendment.”).
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(1999).
187
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191
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But because the right is inert, no doctrine has developed. If and when the right creaks
and groans to life, courts might cite the First Amendment, since the question of coverage has been so prominent there. Or they might cite to the growing body of coverage
decisions about which “arms” are protected by the Second Amendment.192 But the
citation would not really be load-bearing—the court would have to perform the same
analysis (i.e., determine the Amendment’s coverage) even without the First or Second
Amendment precedents.193 Some doctrinal borrowing, it turns out, is not borrowing
at all.
CONCLUSION
As Tim Zick’s new book explains, the First Amendment provides a ready lynchpin for a discussion of Rights Dynamism because of the myriad ways in which it acts
dynamically with other rights.194 The Free Speech Clause is an aggressor, expanding
its reach into the domain of other rights.195 It is also an enabler, fostering an environment generative of important discussions about those rights.196
In this Article, we focus on another role the First Amendment plays, as an active
participant in the “Marketplace of Doctrine”—the arena in which judges and litigants
choose whether to apply the tests and rules developed in one right to another. We
think that splitting the atom of rights and doctrine and focusing on the minutiae of
doctrinal rules can provide valuable insights into the bigger picture questions of
constitutional law. Recognizing when doctrine has or has not moved, and theorizing
why it did or did not do so, has implications for the very meaning of the rights that
doctrine seeks to implement. Studying Doctrinal Dynamism can help to answer questions about why judges and litigants behave in certain ways. And it can offer new
tools of analysis for those hoping to preserve a system of robust, overlapping guarantees
of constitutional rights.
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